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17 MAY 1972

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Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP8510075R000300050020-0

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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17 MAY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 20)

0050020-8

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 MAY 1972

<u>Moscow (3093 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1436 items)</u>		
VE Day	(8%)	19%	Indochina	(17%)	45%
Indochina	(9%)	15%	[Strikes on DRV &	(2%)	34%]
[Strikes on DRV &	(2%)	12%]	Mining of Ports		
Mining of Ports			[Sihanouk Tour of	(3%)	10%]
Czechoslovak Liber-	(0.1%)	4%	DPRK, North China		
ation Anniversary			[PRC Ships Attacked	(--)	5%]
GDR Liberation	(2%)	3%	Domestic Issues	(41%)	28%
Anniversary			Asian Table Tennis	(4%)	7%
Middle East	(3%)	2%	Union Inauguration		
FRG Political Debate	(4%)	2%	Albanian Trade Union	(--)	4%
on Treaties			Congress		
Grechko in Syria	(--)	2%	Somali President in PRC	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi editorial comment and Le Duc Tho at his 12 May Paris press conference have echoed the DRV Government statement of the 10th in asserting the Vietnamese people's determination not to be deterred from their struggle by U.S. military "escalation," including the mining of DRV waterways. Propaganda since the statement has focused on worldwide support, with particular attention given to the Soviet and PRC government statements of 11 May. Hanoi's first explicit mention of the conditions under which the President said that U.S. mining and other military actions would cease came in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 17th rejecting the notion of a UN-sponsored international conference. It said tersely that the Vietnamese "resolutely reject" the President's 8 May proposal for an internationally supervised cease-fire. The PRG's seven-point proposal has continued to be pressed as a reasonable basis for a negotiated settlement. And on 16 May VNA released statements by the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris proposing that the 150th Paris session be held as scheduled.

The 11 May Soviet Government statement on the President's speech was couched in circumspect language consistent with the constraints imposed by Moscow's relations with Washington. It avoided depicting the situation as a challenge to the USSR and did not mention Soviet aid to the Vietnamese, restricting itself to a promise of "support." Followup comment, including a PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov, has stressed the need for a return to the Paris talks.

Peking's restrained reaction to the President's 8 May announcement was registered in the PRC Government statement of the 11th and in similarly cautious remarks by Chou En-lai on the 14th. Avoiding any portrayal of a challenge to Chinese interests or a threat to international security, Peking has minimized its involvement in the situation while directing attention to Hanoi's resolve to carry on the struggle.

DRV NOTES PRESIDENT'S CEASE-FIRE PLAN IN REJECTING UN ROLE

Hanoi has currently reaffirmed its opposition both to a UN role in Indochina and to an international conference and has continued to insist that negotiations be resumed in Paris. VNA had promptly reported, on 12 and 16 May respectively, the letters to the United Nations from Chinese representative Huang Hua and Soviet representative Malik, including the assertion in the Chinese letter

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that "the Vietnamese question has nothing to do with the United Nations." But Hanoi media are not known to have mentioned any of UN Secretary General Waldheim's statements or activities until a Hanoi radio commentary on the 16th took issue with his proposal that the Security Council and other UN organs "be used to settle the Vietnam problem with a view to achieving a cease-fire and advancing toward a peaceful solution in Indochina." The commentary also complained that on 9, 12, and 13 May the Secretary General had distributed a secret memorandum on this problem to members of the Security Council and that he had met with members of the Council and was scheduled to meet with the nonpermanent members. The commentary also cited a 15 May AP item as reporting that "Senator Pearson said in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Nixon will propose holding an Asian peace conference under UN sponsorship with a view to ending the war and settling the political confrontation in Indochina."

Hanoi followed up the radio commentary with the release on the 17th of a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which, as carried by VNA, claimed: "According to Western reports, the United States is plotting to organize an 'Asian peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations' with a view to achieving an 'internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina' as was suggested by President Nixon's 8 May address."* This was Hanoi's first explicit mention of the President's remarks on a cease-fire, and it seems strange that they would be acknowledged in this fashion. The spokesman went on to say that the President's 8 May proposal for a cease-fire "is, in essence, only aimed at forcing the Vietnamese people to lay down their arms, abandon their just fight, and accept the puppet administration, stooge of the United States, and the U.S. neocolonialist domination in South Vietnam." The statement said nothing about the President's

* Hanoi has consistently opposed any UN role in Indochina, and since 1965 has publicized a number of statements on the subject by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman and memoranda from the ministry's information department. Most recently, a 25 May 1970 spokesman's statement assailed the 11-nation Djakarta conference on Cambodia. It complained that the conference communique called for reactivation of the ICC and reconvening of the Geneva conference and that it attempted to bring the Cambodian issue before the United Nations. A series of statements between 1965 and 1967 uniformly declared that the United Nations has no right to intervene in Vietnam and that any UN decision would be illegal and null and void.

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assertion that after an internationally supervised cease-fire and the return of POW's, the United States would cease all military action in Indochina and withdraw all U.S. troops from Vietnam within four months.*

Le Duc Tho in his prepared statement at his 12 May Paris press conference--carried in full by Hanoi radio and summarized by VNA--demanded that the United States respect its commitment to halt the bombing and said it has no right "to dictate its terms as Mr. Nixon did in his 8 May address." However, Tho did not spell out the President's conditions. He did discuss--and reject--the cease-fire proposal in the question-and-answer portion of his press conference, but consistent with past practice Hanoi media did not carry the question-answer segment. In answering a reporter, Tho posed the rhetorical question, "How can there be a cease-fire if the military and the political issues are not settled?"

The foreign ministry spokesman followed his reference to alleged U.S. plans for a UN-sponsored Asian peace conference by assailing the British "for lending a hand to the Nixon Administration" by "feverishly campaigning for a new Geneva conference on Indochina." The spokesman did not elaborate, and Hanoi media are not known to have acknowledged press reports that after the President's speech the British approached the Chinese as well as the Soviet Union regarding a conference. (Le Duc Tho on 12 May responded to a question on the British contacts by saying that these activities "are aimed at deceiving public opinion" and that the British Government is currently supporting the Americans in their war escalation against the DRV "and is no longer qualified" to serve as chairman of the 1954 Geneva conference.)

EMPHASIS ON It is unclear whether Hanoi is genuinely concerned that
PARIS TALKS moves might be afoot to convene a broader conference.
 It is possible that the DRV used the device of the
foreign ministry spokesman's statement to put on record--possibly as
much for its allies as for the United States--its vehement opposition
at present to any negotiating forum other than the Paris conference
and private U.S.-DRV talks. Le Duc Tho in his 12 May statement
discoursed at length on the necessity of resuming the Paris talks. As

* The 9 May LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY report of the President's speech uniquely acknowledged the President's listing of the conditions under which the U.S. mining and other interdiction actions would cease; presumably that acknowledgment was inadvertent.

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other propaganda continues to do, Tho took issue with the President's contention that the Vietnamese are seeking a U.S. surrender. Disclaiming a desire to "humiliate" anyone, Tho said the DRV's only demand is that the United States negotiate seriously. He added that the DRV's position is to terminate the war by negotiations, a way of ending the war which "would enable the United States to withdraw in honor." Tho said that on several occasions President Nixon had failed to "avail himself" of opportunities to settle the Vietnam question, citing as examples the DRV's nine points and the PRG's seven points introduced last summer.

Tho claimed that U.S. bad faith had also been evidenced in connection with the private meetings. Declaring that all the private meetings have been either preceded or followed by U.S. military pressures, Tho contended, as reported by VNA, that when the DRV and the United States were making preparations for the 2 May private meeting "on 16 April Mr. Nixon ordered violent attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong." Tho also complained that although the United States demanded the private meeting, "it produced nothing new apart from insisting on the possibility of giving out information." He claimed that Kissinger finally agreed not to publicize the meeting but that, "as is known to all, Mr. Nixon on 8 May unilaterally made public the meeting." Tho went on to say one could only conclude that the U.S. side wanted a private meeting "to fool the public in an election year" and in order to have a pretext for the "extremely serious escalation" against the DRV on 8 May and for the "sabotage" of the Paris conference. He concluded that "we will never agree to negotiate under American military pressure."

Tho described the Vietnamese "correct and consistent" demand for "an exact date for the prompt and complete withdrawal from South Vietnam of forces of the United States and its camp and the setting up of a three-segment government of broad national concord in South Vietnam in conformity with the PRG's seven points," the two key points of which, he noted, had been elaborated on last February.

VIETNAMESE In the wake of the DRV Government statement of
DETERMINATION 10 May, Hanoi propagandists have repeatedly said
 that the Vietnamese will not be deterred from
their decades-long struggle against aggression by the latest "extremely serious" U.S. war escalation. At the same time, there has been repeated ridicule of U.S. charges that the North Vietnamese have invaded the South. The supporting PRG statement on 12 May, carried by

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by VNA as well as Front media on the 13th, said: "The South Vietnamese people have the right to call for assistance from the kith-and-kin Northern compatriots, from the friendly countries, and from the world people to fight and defeat the U.S. aggression."

Le Duc Tho said in his 12 May statement that the President on 8 May demonstrated his refusal to embark on negotiations and his choice to continue the war. Tho warned: "If he keeps turning a deaf ear to reason, closing his eyes to realities and refusing to enter into serious talks, he will meet with heavier defeats." Tho then went on to question whether the "strategic" defeats in Cambodia and Laos and "the serious setback of the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam at present are not enough to prompt Mr. Nixon to draw the necessary conclusions." Reaffirming that the Vietnamese, "who have been fighting for 25 years," will continue to fight, Tho concluded that it is in the interests of the United States not to misread this determination.

Editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 13 May stressed communist and world support for the DRV in the face of U.S. mining of its ports. Both quoted from worldwide expressions of support, including the Soviet and Chinese government statements of the 11th. The NHAN DAN editorial said pointedly that the DRV is an independent and sovereign country, "a member of the powerful socialist camp and a militant friend of various nations."

Hanoi media, of course, have maintained their silence on the President's projected Moscow visit. Le Duc Tho, asked whether the DRV wanted the USSR to cancel the trip, replied: "We believe that the Soviet Union always supports us. As to whether or not it invites Mr. Nixon to visit it, this is its own business. I have no comment." But Hanoi's position was conveyed pointedly in an article in the April issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP by Huong Nam, who declared, in the course of a broad discussion of U.S. strategy, that "in carrying out his readiness-to-negotiate plot Nixon has succeeded in drawing public attention to the sensational news about his visits to socialist countries and causing public opinion, especially U.S. public opinion, to believe in the possibility of solving difficult problems" Huong Nam added that "a certain relaxation of tensions in relations between the imperialist United States and socialist countries--especially the Soviet Union and China--reflects only the complex campaigns of fundamental and fierce contradictions between two opposite social systems in this era under conditions of discord within the socialist parties and the international communist movement. The Americans can hardly find here an opportunity to solve their difficult problems in a way favorable to their imperialist interests, especially as long as they are still unable to solve their cor problem, the Vietnam problem."

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DRV SPOKESMAN DEMANDS END TO AIR AND NAVAL STRIKES, MINING

Hanoi has denounced sustained U.S. action against North Vietnam with continuing official protests from the foreign ministry on 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 May. Beginning with the 11 May protest, Hanoi has added the demand that the United States "immediately stop mining and blockading the entries to North Vietnam ports" to its standard demand for an end to U.S. bombing and other acts of war allegedly violating the DRV's sovereignty and security. The 15 May protest included the charge that the United States was mining "rivermouths" in Nam Ha Province, and a 16 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, broadcast by Hanoi radio to South Vietnam, charged that since 9 May the U.S. Air Force and Navy "have continuously dropped thousands of mines in the territorial waters of Haiphong, Hong Gai, and Cam Pha and in the mouths of various rivers in the North, from Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, and Thanh Hoa to Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh."

According to Hanoi radio's review of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the army paper on 14 May carried an article entitled "Mines and Facilities to Destroy Them," which asserted that mines have existed as weapons for a long time but that they "easily lose their effectiveness." It concluded that "the Nixon clique's new war escalation in mining DRV harbors is not terrible because, with their initiative and resourcefulness and valor, our armed forces and people will have many ways to destroy and remove mines laid by the enemy in order to open the roads, fight the enemy, and advance." There have been no other such claims in monitored propaganda.

Since the 8 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest, Hanoi has not officially charged that the United States has bombed its dike system, but news reports continue to do so.* For example, VNA reports on the 12th and 13th claimed that in the 10-11 May strikes against Hanoi a portion of the dike on the Red River in Gia Lam district of the capital was hit. The report on the 12th said that on 4 May the United States bombed a dike of the La River in Ha Tinh Province and that "from 30 April to 2 May, U.S. planes struck the Hang Dang dam in Minh Hoa district and the Rao Be and Cam Ly dams in Tuyen Hoa district, Quang Binh." The 16 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary charged that "many dikes and floodgates . . . have been repeatedly struck," such as Rao Be and Cam Ly in Quang Binh, the La River dike in Ha Tinh, various dike sections in southern Nam Ha,

* See the 10 May TRENDS, pages 17-19.

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and the Red River dike system in Yen Tan hamlet, Gia Lam, Hanoi. An editorial in the 12 May NHAN DAN, pointing out new requirements of the war situation, warned that the United States has "openly threatened to strike at our dikes and protective embankments, and in fact they have struck at the dikes in many areas of the 4th military region."

There was some confusion in the propaganda over whether the 11 May protest had been issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman or at the higher level of a foreign ministry statement. VNA's English-language transmission described it as a spokesman's statement, but Hanoi radio in Vietnamese called it a foreign ministry statement. The fact that the action under protest involved Hanoi and Haiphong and covered a three-day period would suggest that the statement would more logically be at the foreign ministry level. The description of the "intensified" air and naval attacks and the mining was in terms more typical of a foreign ministry statement-- "very serious military adventures, very brazen aggressive acts, and extremely savage crimes." The protest also contained other elements present in high-level statements. It asserted that "with these extremely adventurous and frenzied steps of war escalation" the Nixon Administration is hoping to save its Vietnamization program. And it asked for stronger support and called on "the governments and peoples of the brother socialist countries . . . to take resolute and timely actions to stay the bloody hands of the U.S. war maniacs."

The succession of protests leveled the following specific charges:

+ The 11 May statement said that on 9, 10, and 11 May the United States sent "hundreds of aircraft to frantically attack many populous areas" in Hanoi, Haiphong and Yen Bai, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area. It said that U.S. ships "barbarously shelled the coastal areas" of Thanh Hoa and Haiphong. The statement further charged that U.S. planes "wantonly dropped bombs on street quarters, villages, schools, hospitals,* and factories with an obvious intention to massacre civilians and destroy economic establishments and cultural and social

* VNA on the 14th released a statement by the DRV Ministry of Public Health denouncing U.S. "crimes" against DRV hospitals. Earlier, the DRV Ministry of Education had issued a statement on 8 May condemning U.S. raids "against teachers and students" from 3 March to 8 May.

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works of the Vietnamese people." It said that 22 U.S. planes were downed, "many pilots" captured, and three ships "set afire."

A number of VNA reports from 11 to 13 May elaborated on alleged U.S. action over the DRV on the 10th and 11th. For example, a VNA report on the 12th, reporting the "frantic air attacks" against Hanoi on those days, charged derisively that the strikes at "military targets selected by the President and the National Security Council" involved bombing a hospital, shelling historical relics, and "releasing demolition bombs on a small hamlet on the Red River bank and a restaurant at the Yen Vien township on the city's outskirts." VNA on the 11th, in reporting raids against Hanoi that day, said that U.S. bombs hit "many populous quarters inside the city including Phuong Liet quarter in the Dong Da district, a welding enterprise, and the campus of the Hanoi medical college."

A 12 May VNA report elaborated on alleged U.S. action against Quang Ninh Province on the 10th, charging that attacks were directed at "populous quarters in Hon Gai--the capital--and other parts of Quang Ninh Province," including Cam Pha and Coc Sau townships, the Ha Tu colliery, the Cua Ong harbor, and the Bai Chay seaside resort. It said that "heavy property damage and casualties" resulted from these raids.

† The 13 May foreign ministry spokesman's statement said that on 12 May, "in defiance of strong public protest," the United States "continued to drop mines on and blockade Haiphong and other ports of the DRV," and at the same time U.S. planes "savagely attacked many populated areas" in Yen Bai, Hoa Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, and Nghe An provinces and Vinh Linh area.

A VNA report on the 12th added some details on the bombing that day in Nam Ha. It said that on 12 May, "dozens" of U.S. planes "savagely attacked many areas in Nam Ha Province" and that in Nam Dinh city, the targets were many industrial establishments, a number of handicraft cooperatives, and quarters 14 and 1. It alleged that many hamlets or villages in outlying districts were also hit and that "dozens of persons, most of them aged people and children in Giap Ba hamlet, Quang Trung village, Vu Ban district, were killed or wounded." It described some of the casualties and went on to allege that "in Truc Tinh village, Nam Ninh district, 50 houses were reduced to ashes" and that the victims were given "timely medical treatment" by Vietnamese physicians and "members of the Cuban medical brigade." VNA on the 15th carried a report

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on the assistance given by the Cuban medical team to the population of Nam Dinh. (The 16-member medical group "to help the fighting Vietnamese people" had arrived in Hanoi on 6 May and was received by Premier Pham Van Dong that day.)

+ The 14 May spokesman's statement said that on the 13th the United States "continued to conduct savage air raids on many heavily populated areas" in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area and used ships to "bombard the coast of Nghe An Province." It claimed that two U.S. planes were downed.

+ The 15 May statement said that on the 14th the United States "continued to mine river mouths of Nam Ha Province" and that on the same day U.S. planes "barbarously struck at many populated areas" in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, the Vinh Linh area, and Long Chao island "belonging to Haiphong."

+ The 16 May spokesman's statement said that on the 15th the United States "continued to mine and seal off Haiphong harbor and other harbors of the DRV." It said "many" U.S. planes "barbarously hit many populous areas" of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh, "killing many civilians and destroying many economic establishments and cultural and social projects of the Vietnamese people." The statements of the 15th and 16th both asserted that the U.S. actions constituted a "brazen violation" of other countries' rights to free navigation and free trade.

DOWNED U.S. PLANES Hanoi's total of U.S. planes downed over North Vietnam stood at 3,573 as of 17 May.

On the 11th it was alleged that three planes were downed that day over Hanoi and "many pilots" captured. The same report belatedly announced that on 7, 9, and 10 May five planes had been downed in Quang Ninh, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces--an A-7 in Nghe An and an F-4 in Ha Tinh on the 7th, an A-7 in Nghe An on the 9th, and two unidentified planes in Quang Ninh on the 10th. On 13 May Hanoi reported that two planes were downed in Thanh Hoa that day and that a ship was set afire by Haiphong forces on the 12th.

Hanoi reported on the 17th that two planes were downed in Quang Binh and one in Ninh Binh that day. The same report claimed that two planes had been downed on the previous day--one each in Nghe An and Ha Tinh.

On the 12th Hanoi radio reported that the VPA High Command had sent messages of congratulation to the armed forces of Hanoi and Haiphong

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on the 11th and of Thanh Hoa on the 8th for exploits that included the downing of U.S. planes. The message to Hanoi commended the armed forces and people there for downing 12 U.S. planes on 10 and 11 May and "capturing many pirate pilots." The armed forces and people of Haiphong were praised for downing three planes and setting afire three U.S. ships on 9 and 10 May, and those of Thanh Hoa were commended for downing the 300th plane in that province on 7 May. Such messages of commendation from the VPA High Command have been common in the past. The most recent previous known message was sent on 16 April, complimenting the artillery forces in the Fourth Military Sector on having set U.S. ships ablaze. Others had been publicized in February and in early April of this year, as well as in December 1971 and during earlier periods of massive bombing in March 1971 and May and November 1970.

DRV AIR FORCE Although Hanoi has not acknowledged U.S. reports that MIG's have been downed in recent actions over the North, it has publicized the expanded role of the DRV's air force. Thus Hanoi radio on the 11th, in reporting "great victories" won in Hanoi the previous day, noted that "in a sector of the capital's airspace our people's air force units assaulted the enemy in time. Their gleaming aircraft flew over each U.S. F-4 and destroyed it. The Red Star unit--a heroic unit which repeatedly won glorious victories in Hanoi's airspace--also participated in attacking the enemy. Our aircraft, which coordinated very harmoniously with our ground forces, destroyed wave after wave of U.S. planes." And on the 15th Hanoi VNA transmitted to East Europe a radiophoto of the Red Star Unit, which the caption said "has many U.S. planes downed to its credit in recent dog-fights."

CAPTURED PILOTS No newly captured American pilot has been identified or put on display at a Hanoi press conference since 17 April, when a pilot said to have been captured on the 15th was presented at a press conference held to condemn the U.S. bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi.* On 13 May, however, Hanoi media publicized a press conference of a somewhat different character held the preceding day by the DRV Foreign Ministry's Information and Press Service, allegedly at the request of eight U.S. prisoners captured in February 1972 and earlier. The purpose, Hanoi said, was to enable the POW's to explain the main contents of a message they had sent earlier to the American people and Congress appealing for an end to the war and

* Newly captured American pilots were similarly presented at press conferences on 19 February of this year and on 20 and 30 December 1971.

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to permit them to answer questions from Vietnamese and foreign newsmen. Hanoi's publicity for the press conference served as a foil to its publicity for the message on the 11th.

USSR SCORES MINING IN RESTRAINED STATEMENT, MEXICO COMMENT

The 11 May Soviet Government statement reacted to President Nixon's 8 May speech in careful, restrained language consistent with Moscow's general attempt to strike a balance between the dictates of support for Hanoi and the constraints imposed by its relations with Washington. The initial TASS report of the 9th had been of a time-marking character, and Moscow's sensitivity had been reflected in the absence of the usual followup radio and press comment. The official reaction did, however, come more quickly than Soviet statements on Indochina generally have in the past. The most recent previous Soviet Government statement on Indochina was one of 11 February 1972 which supported the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its seven-point proposal--issued after the President's 25 January disclosure of the secret DRV-U.S. peace talks. A DRV Government statement had been issued on 5 February. Operations in Laos in February 1971 were protested in a belated Soviet Government statement on 25 February, 15 days after a DRV Government statement. The Cambodian incursion, protested in a 30 April 1970 DRV Government statement, prompted a Soviet Government statement on 4 May, read by Kosygin at a press conference.*

The current statement used notably restrained language and relied on legalistic arguments against the U.S. mining of DRV ports. Thus it called the U.S. moves a "gross violation" of the generally accepted principles of freedom of navigation, notwithstanding the fact that the United States had signed the 1958 Geneva conventions on maritime law. The statement went on to say that the U.S. actions

* Moscow's only other government statements on Indochina during the Nixon Administration were issued on 30 December 1971 on the sustained U.S. air strikes against the DRV--which had prompted DRV Foreign Ministry statements on the 26th and 29th--and on 16 December 1970 in support of the 10 December DRV joint party-government appeal following the sustained U.S. air strikes and the abortive prisoner-rescue attempt in North Vietnam. The recent 16 April DRV joint party-government appeal following the U.S. air strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi was not endorsed in an official Soviet statement, although Moscow had promptly protested the strikes in a TASS statement on the 16th.

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"are inadvisable," and the United States will bear "all responsibility" for possible consequences, and that the Soviet Government insists that the U.S. steps "be immediately cancelled."

The statement did say that "this dangerous and slippery road" can only lead to a new complication of the international situation and asked rhetorically what would happen if other states, in response, were to act in the manner in which the United States has behaved in Vietnam. The TASS statement of 16 April protesting that day's bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi--the most recent previous Soviet official statement on Indochina--had also warned that U.S. actions could lead to a "complication of the international situation as a whole." By contrast, Moscow had been more directly critical of the United States in its government statements on the operations in Cambodia and Laos in 1970 and 1971. The 4 May 1970 statement had questioned the President's professed desire for "an era of negotiations" and for talks to solve "urgent international problems." And the 25 February 1971 statement on Laos had specifically warned that U.S. actions could affect Soviet-American relations.

Moscow's circumspection regarding the Nixon Administration was particularly evident in the passage in the current statement on escalation of the war. It took one obvious jab at the President when it said the real objective of U.S. actions is not to "save the United States from humiliation" but to salvage the "notorious" Vietnamization policy, which it said "is obviously failing." But it went on to refer only to "Washington" when it complained that U.S. acts of escalation "again demonstrate the predatory nature of the war," that one aggressive action leads to another still more dangerous one, and that earlier "barbarous acts and crimes" are being augmented by new and still more serious ones.

Declaring that the only way to settle the Vietnam problem is to respect the people's right to decide their own destiny, the statement said that if the United States is really ready to do this it should return to the negotiating table in Paris. This passage prefaced the demand that the U.S. moves be "immediately cancelled." The statement expressed confidence that governments and peoples of all peace-loving states shared such a viewpoint. And it concluded, in keeping with its general tone of restraint, with a pledge to give the Vietnamese "all necessary support" but made no mention of "aid."

The Moscow domestic service on the 12th noted briefly that a White House spokesman said the Soviet Government statement had been received and was being studied by the U.S. Government, and the next

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day the domestic service said the American press was giving "great attention" to the statement. The first PRAVDA comment came on 12 May in an article by the paper's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, who highlighted the government statement's warning that the "new expansion of aggressive actions" by the United States is "fraught with serious consequences for international peace and security" and pointed to worldwide condemnation of U.S. acts. Like the government statement, the article contained no personal reference to President Nixon. Zhukov referred instead to the "American armed forces," the Pentagon, and the "U.S. Administration." He assailed the Administration for seeking "legal justification" for its action, ridiculing UN Ambassador Bush's argument that the United States was exercising its right to "collective self-defense."

Participants in the 14 May domestic service roundtable discussion questioned the legality of the U.S. action and repeated the Soviet statement's demand that the "blockade" be called off immediately.* One panelist acknowledged that Secretary Laird has said the United States was not in fact establishing a "blockade," which would require stopping and searching all ships when they enter DRV territorial waters. (A brief 11 May domestic service report of Laird's press conference the day before had noted that Laird said the United States will continue to build up its air and naval forces in Vietnam and continue bombings, but did not report that he indicated that the United States would take action to interdict ships and even to stop a Soviet airlift if necessary.) The roundtable panelist argued that, whatever terminology is used, the United States is interfering with the freedom of shipping, and "this is the guideline for the Soviet Government in its actions to protect its ships carrying freight to the fraternal socialist country." The panelist did not elaborate on the reference to protection of Soviet ships. Another panelist, observing that Kissinger had said the United States does not regard its actions as a confrontation with the Soviet Union and is only seeking a way to end the conflict, commented that Paris is the forum where the United States could discuss its proposals with the Vietnamese side.

Zhukov said in the PRAVDA article that the "collapse" of the Vietnamization policy had prompted Washington to embark on a new

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"Americanization" of the war. But the Americans "must finally realize," he said, "that they will not achieve a military solution in Indochina." Recalling that President Johnson had been impelled to call off the bombing of the DRV and embark on the path of negotiation, he said the American people have not forgotten that "lesson" and are calling increasingly for an immediate halt to "the Pentagon's" operations against North Vietnam and a return to the negotiating table. Zhukov concluded by citing the Soviet Government statement's call for a U.S. return to the Paris talks. And a domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on 15 May observed that this call is of "particular importance" in the context of the USSR's policy on "the priority of talks and of interstate and intergovernmental contacts in the settlement of controversial international questions."

SOVIET SUPPORT,
PROTEST MEETINGS

While the recent comment has avoided highlighting Soviet aid, and the government statement referred only to "support," followup statements by various Soviet public organizations have promised continued Soviet "aid" as well as support. A PRAVDA editorial on Soviet foreign policy in general, summarized by TASS on the 17th, also stated briefly that the Soviet people, "loyal to the principles of socialist internationalism," will continue to give the Vietnamese people "the necessary assistance and support."*

Moscow media have been reporting low-level protest meetings held throughout the USSR to support the Soviet Government statement--a standard device to mobilize public opinion behind government statements on Indochina. Radio Moscow as well as the radios of Vladivostok and Odessa also have reported protest meetings in Soviet ports at which seamen and dockers expressed determination to continue dispatching aid to Vietnam. TASS on the 13th reported radiograms from crews of Soviet ships in Haiphong expressing resolve to continue helping the Vietnamese. On 12 May the Moscow domestic service carried a statement by the head of the eastern department of the directorate of Black Sea shipping lines announcing that "eight heavy tonnage oceangoing ships are on the way from Odessa and Ilyichevsk to Haiphong." (Broadcasts over Vladivostok and Odessa radios on 13 May each named three ships en route to DRV ports.) The shipping official's announcement may have been broadcast inadvertently over the

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central radio. It was not rebroadcast or carried by TASS; and in reply to service messages from VNA in Hanoi on 14 and 15 May requesting the Soviet announcement for rebroadcast in Hanoi media, VNA's Moscow office said it had been unable to obtain the report from the Soviets.

OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET RESTRAINT Moscow's restraint has been evidenced in a variety of other ways. TASS' brief summary of the 10 May DRV Government statement omitted all the personal attacks on President Nixon, as well as the DRV statement's assertion that the U.S. actions constituted a challenge to "various socialist countries."

In reporting the 11 May meeting between Kosygin and Xuan Thuy, who had stopped over in Moscow en route from Paris to Hanoi, TASS said blandly that the conversation took place in "a cordial, comradely atmosphere, in the spirit of friendship and solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people." TASS did not report comments attributed to Kosygin in a 12 May VNA report, which quoted him as "sternly condemning" the U.S. mining and "blockading" of DRV ports and as expressing Soviet resolve to continue to "assist" the Vietnamese people. The VNA report noted that the DRV ambassador, who was present during the conversation, handed Kosygin a copy of the DRV Government statement.*

On 15 May TASS briefly reported that Vice Premier Novikov received the PRG ambassador for a "warm and friendly talk," again omitting details. In a service message from Moscow to Hanoi on the 16th, VNA said the ambassador gave Novikov a copy of the PRG's 12 May statement of protest against the U.S. actions and that Novikov "affirmed the Soviet Union's stand of continuing to support and help the just struggle of the Vietnamese people, as expressed in the 11 May Soviet Government statement."** On the 16th TASS briefly reported without elaboration that Novikov received the DRV ambassador

* The DRV ambassador had been received by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Grechko, and Katushev last month. The timing suggested that these were meetings at which the DRV envoy presented the 11 April DRV Government statement and the 16 April DRV Party-Government appeal protesting U.S. bombings, but neither Moscow's nor Hanoi's reports of the meetings mentioned that he did so.

** There were no available reports that any Soviet leaders received a PRG envoy following the release of the 15 April NFLSV-PRG appeal.

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that day for a talk in "a warm friendly atmosphere." Again, a VNA service message from Moscow the next day added details unpublicized by Moscow, saying Novikov reaffirmed that the Soviet Government and people, "faithful to their international obligation," will continue to "support" the Vietnamese people as affirmed in the Soviet Government statement.

VNA, but thus far not Moscow media, reported Soviet Ambassador Malik's letter to the president of the UN Security Council, circulated on the 15th. VNA reported on the 16th that the letter "vehemently denounced" President Nixon's "new war escalation" and "emphatically protested an attempt of the U.S. Government in the UN Security Council to justify its latest aggressive acts" (On 10 May TASS had briefly reported, without comment, UN Secretary General Waldheim's appeal to all parties to act with restraint and his recollection that he had repeatedly offered mediation on Vietnam.)

On 12 May VNA reported another incident, on the 10th, in which a Soviet ship was damaged during raids on Haiphong. According to VNA, the captain was injured and a crewman was killed. Like a similar incident on the 9th, protested in a 10 May DRV Chamber of Commerce statement, this one was ignored in Moscow media. East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 12 May, however, published a dispatch from a correspondent in Haiphong reporting the incident of the 9th.

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PRC REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON MINING

Peking's restrained reaction to President Nixon's 8 May announcement on mining DRV ports has been registered on the elite level in the carefully measured PRC Government statement on the 11th and similarly cautious remarks by Chou En-lai in a speech on the 14th. Speaking at a banquet for the visiting Somali president, Chou echoed the government statement in calling the U.S. action "a grave escalation" of the war, but neither Chou nor the statement portrayed a challenge to Chinese interests or a threat to the international situation. In contrast, the Somali president condemned the action as "a deliberate threat" to international security and demanded the immediate cessation of U.S. "aggression." The Chinese have avoided posing demands, choosing rather to minimize their involvement in the situation while directing attention to Hanoi's resolve to carry on the struggle. Thus, Chou expressed confidence that the Vietnamese communists could not be intimidated, and the government statement approvingly cited the 10 May DRV Government statement's avowal of resolve to persist in the war over a long period if necessary. The Chinese statement pledged in routine terms that Peking will continue to provide "rear area" support and assistance to its Vietnamese allies.

Peking has implicitly differentiated between its response to the U.S. interdiction measures per se and its reaction to incidents involving direct damage to the Chinese. Both the government statement and an 11 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, released earlier, called the action announced by the President a provocation against the Vietnamese people and "the people of the whole world," thus sidestepping any charge of provocation against the Chinese themselves. The latter charge has appeared during the current phase of Vietnam developments only in the case of alleged shelling of Chinese ships before the mining operation and damage to the Chinese economic mission in Hanoi during air strikes on the 10th. A PRC Foreign Ministry statement on the 9th protested the shelling of the ships, but only a brief NCNA dispatch from Hanoi has mentioned the Chinese economic mission, and this came after Hanoi had publicized the event. The foreign ministry statement differed notably from previous such protests a few years ago in failing to raise the issue of Chinese aid to Vietnam.

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Consistent with its approach since the Sino-U.S. summit, Peking has avoided criticizing the President directly in commenting on his decision. The government statement dismissed the "hypocritical assertion" by the "U.S. Government" that its moves are designed not to expand but to end the war, and Commentator derided Washington's talk about wanting to end the war as "sheer deceitful lies"--a charge similar to one contained in the previous PRC Government statement on Vietnam on 4 February. There has been no mention of the President's reference to an internationally supervised cease-fire and a U.S. troop withdrawal, and the Vietnamese communist peace proposals have also been ignored in Peking-originated comment. The government statement did, however, raise the POW and withdrawal issues in saying the prisoners will be returned if the United States withdraws its forces unconditionally and "ceases supporting the puppet cliques" in Indochina.

The Chinese statement accused the United States of having "crudely violated" the 1954 Geneva agreements. This falls short of the longstanding Chinese claim that the accords had long since been "torn to pieces" and are no longer valid, a charge Peking has avoided in recent weeks. The statement derided the U.S. position that the North Vietnamese had mounted an invasion, but it was left to the Commentator article to argue more explicitly that the North Vietnamese "are fully entitled" to support their "flesh-and-blood compatriots" in the South and that "the Vietnamese people" have a right to wage the war "in unity." Only the Commentator article mentioned the communist offensive in the South, limiting itself to claiming that the "splendid victories" have dealt "a heavy blow" to Vietnamization.

Peking's reaction to the President's announcement followed a standard pattern, with the release of the Commentator article and the government statement on the 11th accompanied by a spate of pickups of foreign reaction. While carrying the texts of the 10 May DRV statement and the 12 May PRG statement along with official statements from other communist capitals, Peking has again used an editorial scalpel to excise passages from less authoritative foreign comment containing offensive personal attacks on the President or raising issues particularly sensitive to the Chinese vis-a-vis the Nixon Administration. Thus, NCNA's account of a 12 April LPA commentary omitted its denunciation of the President as an "arrogant and bloodthirsty hawk," and NCNA has scrupulously deleted passages in Vietnamese commentaries broaching the factor of U.S. presidential politics. In recent

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months Peking has been careful to avoid any suggestion that there is a viable alternative to the Nixon Administration.

PARIS TALKS Peking's more extensive attention to developments surrounding the Paris talks during recent months was again in evidence during DRV negotiator Xuan Thuy's recent stopover en route home. Previously, his stopovers were given little notice by Peking and his connection with the Paris talks was left unmentioned. NCNA reported on the 13th that Thuy, identified as head of the DRV delegation in Paris, arrived that day and had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou and other Chinese officials. NCNA embellished the show of warmth by saying they conversed as "comrades and brothers." Among those greeting Thuy on arrival were Huang Chen, PRC ambassador to France; DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who had arrived in Peking on 3 May "to discuss" the PRC's 1972 supplementary aid to Vietnam; and Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov.

Peking's more forthcoming approach to the Nixon Administration as a negotiating partner was reflected in NCNA's selective account of Le Duc Tho's 12 May statement to the press in Paris. NCNA omitted a passage in which Tho deplored U.S. "lack of sincerity" in the negotiations, in the process avoiding his claim that the Administration had used the 2 May secret meeting to deceive public opinion in an election year. The NCNA account cited Tho's professions of an interest in a negotiated settlement, including his disavowal of an intent to humiliate the United States and his invocation of the Geneva accords as the basis for a settlement. As if to suggest a more compromising approach than the Vietnamese communists have taken, NCNA quoted Tho's reiteration of terms calling for a U.S. troop withdrawal and for a government of three segments but excised a phrase--the only part omitted from a passage left otherwise intact--saying these terms are "as envisaged" by the PRG's seven-point plan and its 2 February elaboration of the "two key points."

LETTER TO UN In a letter to the United Nations dated 11 May and released by NCNA on the same day, PRC representative Huang Hua made clear Peking's opposition to a UN role in the Vietnam conflict. Stating flatly that the Vietnam question "has nothing to do with the United Nations in the first place," Huang sought to discourage the new secretary general from pursuing his initiative of involving the Security Council, pointing out that the United Nations "has never meddled" in the Vietnam question since the 1954 Geneva conference.

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MOSCOW, PEKING CITE ONE ANOTHER'S VIETNAM STATEMENTS

Moscow and Peking have been putting a correct face on their relations as their Vietnamese allies appeal for support in the face of U.S. interdiction moves. Each side acknowledged the other's formal statement on President Nixon's 8 May announcement, and each noted the presence of the other country's ambassador during DRV negotiator Xuan Thuy's stopovers in Moscow and Peking on his way home from Paris.* However, these are incremental moves rather than dramatic departures from past practice, and each side has continued low-level sniping at its rival. An effort to give a more correct and less acrimonious appearance to Sino-Soviet relations has been under way since the Peking border talks began in October 1969, and there have been signs in recent weeks that the two communist sides have sought to limit the U.S. leverage in the triangular relationship during the period of the President's summit meetings.

MOSCOW A collection of TASS reports on foreign statements, published in PRAVDA on the 13th, included one on the PRC Government statement on the President's announcement. The PRC statement was quoted as condemning the President's decision and pledging Chinese backing as Vietnam's "reliable rear area."** In the past Moscow on occasion has acknowledged official Chinese statements on Vietnam and other subjects, including the 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air strikes on the DRV.

A 12 May TASS report on Xuan Thuy's departure from Moscow on his way home via Peking noted the presence of the PRC ambassador, the first such Soviet acknowledgment of the presence of a Chinese

* Thuy arrived in Moscow on 10 May and departed on the 12th, arrived in Peking on the 13th and departed on the 16th, and returned to Hanoi on the 16th. VNA reported on the 17th that after his return he had "separate meetings" with the Soviet, Chinese, and Cambodian ambassadors, the Pathet Lao representative, and the French delegate general.

** The original version carried by TASS and the Moscow domestic radio on the 12th did not include the Chinese pledge of support. Thus, the press version carried the next day conveyed a stronger Chinese reaction.

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envoy in connection with stopovers of DRV and PRG delegates to the Paris talks. Moscow has not normally reported the presence of Chinese at departures or arrivals of Vietnamese delegations, but a precedent for the recent event occurred when the Chinese ambassador was reported present for the departure of Le Duan in May 1971 after attending the CPSU Congress.

Moscow has limited its criticism of Peking's Vietnam policy to broadcasts in Mandarin. For example, a broadcast on the 14th over Radio Peace and Progress cited foreign sources for references to Peking's "anti-Soviet and splittist" policy and to the improved Sino-U.S. relations as permitting Washington to take "extreme measures" against the DRV. Moscow's broadcasts to the Chinese have also appealed for "united action" in support of the Vietnamese. A Mandarin-language commentary over Radio Moscow on the 12th, stressing the role played by Soviet military aid to the DRV, cited the DRV Government statement's appeal to the communist and other countries to stay the U.S. hand in Vietnam. Closing with a call on the Chinese to take united action with the other communist countries, the commentary struck a familiar polemical note in saying the United States invariably considers Peking's "splittist" stand when deciding on escalating the war.

Overall, the level and hostility of Soviet comment on China have dropped markedly since the polemical campaign surrounding the Sino-U.S. summit. This development, however, seems related to the triangular great-power situation rather than to the recent phase of the Vietnam conflict. These considerations were reflected in Brezhnev's major foreign policy address on 20 March, the date also of chief Soviet negotiator Ilichev's return to the Peking border talks. Brezhnev deferred judgment on the implications of the President's China trip while looking forward in a positive spirit to the impending Soviet-U.S. summit. Brezhnev's conciliatory approach, followed by Soviet polemical restraint toward the Chinese, suggests an effort to avoid any impression of Sino-Soviet tension that might enhance the U.S. bargaining position.

PEKING In the only unusual departure from Peking's past practice, the NCNA domestic service--but not the international service--carried the text of the 11 May Soviet Government statement on the President's announcement. In the past Peking republished Soviet documents, but as "negative examples" accompanied by polemical commentary. Peking has not commented on the Soviet reaction to the President's announcement or on his remarks addressed to Moscow.

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On the 11th, the same day its domestic service carried the Soviet statement, NCNA's international service reported the presence of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov at the Peking airport to greet Xuan Thuy. NCNA had also reported Tolstikov's presence at the airport on 29 April when Le Duc Tho departed for Moscow on his way back to Paris, and for the past two years the Chinese have noted the presence of Soviet envoys at the arrival or departure of DRV representatives whose itinerary also included Moscow. Other recent Chinese gestures to the Soviets--such as the Soviet border negotiators' tour of South China last month, publicized by both sides--have also had precedents in the past year or so. There have been new elements, however, as in the report by both sides that the two border delegations laid wreaths at the "Pavilion of the Blood-Sealed Friendship Between the Chinese and Soviet Peoples." In addition, during the President's China visit Peking reported for the first time in several years that Chinese officials in Manchurian cities placed wreaths in honor of Soviet Armed Forces Day on memorials for fallen Soviet soldiers.

In the meantime, Peking's anti-Soviet polemics have continued on the low level maintained since the harsh exchanges at the time of the Indian-Pakistani conflict. NCNA cited a speech by a Chinese worker delegation leader in Tirana on 9 May in which she lauded Albanian resistance to "modern revisionism with the Soviet revisionist clique at its center," but Peking has left it to third parties to criticize Moscow on the Vietnam question. On the 11th NCNA carried excerpts from a pro-Peking Australian party publication that assailed Moscow for collaborating with the United States "for a Far East Munich to sell out the Indochinese people." NCNA on the 14th picked up an Albanian charge that Moscow was exerting pressure on the Vietnamese to accept the recent U.S. peace proposals.

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DRV, FRONT COMMENT ON WAR IN SOUTH, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Vietnamese communist media continue routinely to laud the communists' military achievements in South Vietnam in recent weeks, stressing that their "victories" demonstrate the failure of Vietnamization and pointing out the importance of the expansion of "liberated areas." The prospect of further attacks was raised in a 15 May Liberation Radio "editorial," pegged to the 19 May anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth, which claimed that the Liberation forces "have the conditions to expand the scope of their offensive, to liberate one area after another, and to create good spring, yards for attacking the enemy even more vigorously." The "armed forces and people," according to the editorial, "are advancing toward winning the greatest victories and achieving merits to commemorate" Ho's birthday.

COMPARISON WITH ANTI-FRENCH WAR

A comparison between the communists' alleged defeat of the allied tactic of using fire bases and the communist victories over the French in 1950 was drawn in an article in the 5 May NHAN DAN, attributed to "Tien Cong" (Attack). Citing fire bases overrun by communist forces during the current offensive, Tien Cong observed that "the Americans are worried not only about the loss of a score of bases, but also about the fact that one of the basic tactics of their defense strategy on the battlefield is collapsing." He noted that the fire bases are often built in a network to provide mutual support and went on to point out that if several bases are "encircled and attacked at the same time, they cannot help one another and are plunged into confusion." According to Tien Cong, the liberation troops, "having high morale, clever tactics, and increasingly improved equipment," can "at one time attack and occupy a series of the enemy's most powerful fire bases."

Theorizing on the implications of PLAF successes, Tien Cong observed that "when one side in a war is capable of defeating a basic tactic of the adversary, it is capable of changing the situation on the battlefield." "Such a situation," he maintained, "actually occurred during our people's war of resistance against the French colonialists, when our VPA was strong enough to launch attacks against strongholds and attack and occupy large bases such as Dong Khe in the autumn of 1950." The French system of defense based on bunkers was stalemated both theoretically and practically, Tien Cong continued, and "immediately after that, General De Lattre's concrete defense line went bankrupt." Tien Cong noted that thereafter, in early 1954, the VPA captured the Dien Bien Phu base and endangered the French defense system of base complexes, and that the French encountered "many acute

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contradictions" and were "driven into a more seriously passive position." He commented: "The L.B.-puppets are facing the same situation."

DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap discussed the same period of the resistance against the French in his lengthy four-part article, entitled "Arm the Revolutionary Masses and Build the People's Army," which Hanoi has been publicizing in installments since December.* In the third part of the article, published in the February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, Giap portrayed the resistance war against the French in such a way as to highlight its similarities with the current fighting, although he did not draw any direct analogies. Even pointing in effect to a precursor to Vietnamization, Giap said that the French in 1947 tried to "use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese." His account of the 1950 border campaign has many parallels with the apparent communist objectives in their current offensive. Giap noted that in 1950 the communists launched a "big military campaign" and destroyed "an important part of the enemy's seasoned mobile forces," "pierced through the defense lines in the border area, liberated a vast area, and constructed roads to communicate with socialist countries.**

QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN
COUNTEROFFENSIVES

Vietnamese communist media promptly acknowledged and deprecated the 13 May attacks by South Vietnamese marines in

Quang Tri, north of the My Chanh River. Hanoi and Front broadcasts on the 14th and the Hanoi press on the 15th ridiculed Saigon's claims to have launched a counteroffensive to retake Quang Tri Province and to have reoccupied Hai Lang district town. The communists alleged that the marines advancing on the ground were "immediately intercepted" and sustained 100 casualties. At the same time, according to communist reports, the PLAF countered the airborne marine assault by downing six aircraft, including "four helicopters" carrying marines, causing "the rest of the enemy air fleet" to "turn tail in panic."

* Portions of the Giap article labeled parts one, two, and three were published, respectively, in the December, January, and February issues of the military journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN; the March issue of the journal is not available. The first and second parts of the article were published in the January and February issues of the party journal HOC TAP. The article was not continued in the March issue of HOC TAP, but the April issue carried the portion of the third part previously published in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, as well as an apparent continuation of this third part. The fourth part of the article is not yet available.

** This portion of Giap's article is discussed in the 26 April TRENDS, pages 6-8.

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Hanoi and Front broadcasts on the 14th related the South Vietnamese assault to the government's efforts to shore up morale for the defense of Hue. Liberation Radio ascribed particular significance to this point, claiming that "the U.S.-Thieu clique is worried about Hue because the fall of this city would mean an end to Vietnamization and the collapse of the Thieu regime."

Hanoi has also denied Saigon's claim to have reoccupied Fire Base Bantogne (designated Dong Tranh base by the communists) on 15 May. An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 17th declared that "the 'victory' boasted by the enemy is a sheer fabrication, since Saigon troops have not succeeded in getting anywhere near Bantogne, let alone in 'recapturing' it." According to the article, the report that the base southwest of Hue had been recaptured was designed to "cover the real defeats" of the allies. "The few weak probes by the Saigon troops," the paper added, "were magnified only to strengthen the morale of the U.S.-paid army in Saigon."

POLICIES OF THE QUANG TRI
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE

Further directives from the revolutionary administration in Quang Tri Province have been publicized, following a communique released on 4 May which announced the formation of a "provisional" committee for Quang Tri city.* On 11 May Liberation Radio broadcast a 10-point communique of the Quang Tri provincial revolutionary committee--dated 24 April, a week before the communists' capture of the province--proclaiming the abolition of the GVN's provincial government and establishment of the "people's revolutionary administration." Reflecting the communists' apparent concern to win the sympathy of the population, the 24 April communique promised that the lives, property, and rights of the people will be protected; that the property of the "U.S. imperialists" and the Saigon government will be turned into public property; that industry, trade, and public installations will be safeguarded; and that the lives and property of foreign residents will be protected. It called upon personnel of the Saigon army and government to report to the revolutionary administration with their weapons and gear, and it reiterated the offer in the PRG's 25 January 10-point statement to help them return to their homes or allow them to "serve the revolutionary administration."

On the 12th Liberation Radio broadcast a much longer 10-point communique from the Quang Tri committee which covered many of the points raised in the 24 April document. The new communique bore no date, but its

* This initial communique is discussed in the 10 May TRENDS, page 23.

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statement that all government installations are confiscated and will be managed by the revolutionary administration "as of today" suggests that it was drafted around the beginning of May at the time of the communist takeover of the province.

The undated communique promised, among other things, that there would be no discrimination against families of people serving the Saigon regime and declared that the "revolutionary administration" is ready to cooperate with all elements "approving of peace, independence, neutrality, the ousting of the Americans, and the toppling of Nguyen Van Thieu." It said that the revolutionary administration will punish any who oppose it or disturb order and security and added that it will commend those who help prevent enemy sabotage. Like the earlier communique, this one pledged to protect the lives, property, and work of the people and all public installations. It also offered a "guarantee" of "freedom and democracy for all Vietnamese citizens" and endorsed the principle of "equality, unity, and mutual support between various nationalities." Civil servants were instructed to resume their work and insure the normal functioning of their agencies; and soldiers were offered the terms of the 25 January statement. Finally, the communique reiterated the promise to protect "legitimate rights" of foreign residents "who lead an honest life," and it specified that this offer extended to "American residents."

On 13 May Liberation Radio broadcast another 10-point communique from the Quang Tri committee, dated that day, which outlined 10 "commandments" for "cadres, personnel, and combatants in the newly liberated area." Among other things, the commandments directed that the lives and property of the people be protected, that individuals and houses not be searched without authority, that criminals be handed over to responsible organs for prosecution, that property not be misappropriated, and that damages be indemnified. It also enjoined the cadres and combatants not to be haughty or oppress the people and to be "diligent, thrifty, honest, and impartial."

Along with the release of official communiqués from the Quang Tri revolutionary administration, Vietnamese communist media have publicized low-level reports on the situation in that province. For example, LPA reported on the 14th that regional and guerrilla forces in Hai Lang district had "persuaded 150 puppet agents to surrender" and had seized various weapons. In addition, according to LPA, "65 puppet agents including village chiefs, policemen, and members of the local administration in Trieu Phong district

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surrendered . . . to the local people." A 16 May VNA report attributed to a NHAN DAN correspondent, on the Quang Tri population's attitude toward the "liberation forces," mentioned a meeting to elect a "people's administration."

REACTION TO SAIGON'S
MARTIAL LAW MEASURES

Hanoi press articles on 14 May and other commentaries predictably scored the martial law measures announced by the South Vietnamese Government on 11 May. NHAN DAN's comment that "the fascist measures cannot save the Thieu clique from collapse" was typical. The paper added that "brazen acts of banditry and murder" will only make the regime more isolated and that "indiscriminate press-gangling and troop upgrading" will only make the ARVN "more ramshackle and more easily disintegrated." A Liberation Radio commentary charged that President Thieu had "exposed himself as a fascist who wants to centralize all power in his own hands" and labeled him "the number one enemy of the people." The radio claimed that the "Vietnamization boat is sinking" and that Thieu is "sustaining severe defeats, faced with the strength of the people who are arising to topple him."

HANOI ANNOUNCES REGULATIONS ON MAINTAINING ORDER AND SECURITY

Hanoi propaganda continues to register concern about the maintenance of order and security in the face of U.S. air strikes and the disruption caused by the evacuation of major cities. Hanoi media reported on 11 May that the Premier had issued a decision on the 5th promulgating regulations on maintaining security and order and managing commerce in wartime. The decision was described as implementing a Council of Ministers resolution adopted at a "regular" meeting on 17 April--the day after the massive U.S. air attacks in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Available propaganda had not previously mentioned the Council of Ministers meeting.

The 5 May decision called for the dissemination and enforcement of a series of regulations which, among other things, warned of "severe punishment" for persons who "take advantage of war conditions to sabotage production and combat tasks, disturb security, and order, spread false news, engage in bandit or hooligan activities, or encroach" on private or public property. Indicating some of the specific problems Hanoi faces, the regulations also asserted that "it is strictly forbidden to engage in speculation, in illegal trade, in the sale and purchase of food ration cards, or in exploiting the evacuated people and agencies transporting them or selling them food." Elements responsible for enforcing order and security and

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managing commerce were also warned not to "abandon their posts or take advantage of their function to cause damage to the state and people."

Hanoi had evinced similar concern over problems of order and security during the U.S. air strikes against the DRV between 1965 and 1968. For example, Hoang Quoc Viet, in his role as the chief of the DRV's Supreme Procuratorate, reported to a National Assembly session in April 1966 that during the past year his branch had "heightened the duties and intensified the task of controlling the execution of the law in order to strengthen the socialist legal system and serve the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in wartime." In the same report, released by Hanoi on 8 May 1966, Viet called for the further dissemination of existing laws and enactment of new laws "to satisfy the demands of wartime." A decree on counterrevolutionary crimes was approved in October 1967.* And in October 1970, two years after the bombing halt, decrees on crimes of infringement on private and socialist property were adopted.

Problems created by evacuation of the population were acknowledged in Hanoi media as early as 1965, although evacuation measures were given the greatest attention following the first U.S. air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area in June 1966. An article by Le Quoc Than, vice minister of public security, in the June 1965 issue of TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING) pointed up many security problems. Than urged, among other things, that the lives and property of refugees be protected and that there be a movement to "promptly combat hoarding and speculation of goods and other tricks intended to oppress the refugees in their daily trade."

* The decree on counterrevolutionary crimes, made public in March 1968, is discussed in the 28 March 1968 FBIS SURVEY, pages 15-17.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW COMMENT LAYS GROUNDWORK FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO USSR

After a month-long hiatus that coincided with the heightening of tensions over Vietnam, Soviet central media have now resumed comment preparatory to President Nixon's visit to Moscow--in a lower key than before, seeking to rationalize Brezhnev's detente policy in the present situation. Editorials in IZVESTIYA on the 16th and in PRAVDA on the 17th, while avoiding direct mention of the summit, emphasized the "possibility" and "desirability" of improved relations with the United States. The editorials closely followed the lines of Brezhnev's 20 March speech at the Soviet trade union congress in portraying a Soviet policy of settling international problems by negotiation rather than confrontation. Defensively reaffirming Moscow's loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, the PRAVDA editorial expressed "solidarity" with the North Vietnamese struggle and stated that the USSR will continue to provide "necessary aid and support."

PRAVDA EDITORIAL Entitled "Steering a Leninist Course," the PRAVDA editorial portrayed Moscow as "consistently" pursuing a policy of coexistence, successfully balancing the "vital interests of mankind" and world peace with those of its allies. PRAVDA argued that "the choice mankind faces today is between cooperation and confrontation, of relaxation or the heightening of tension and, in the long run, the choice of the policy of peace or the policy of war." Under such conditions, it asserted, the Soviet Union "invariably declares for liquidation of the hotbeds of war." At the same time, the paper defensively insisted, Moscow "firmly upholds the interests of world socialism, of all its friends and allies." The editorial went on to pledge loyalty to socialist internationalism and specifically to the DRV, promising the latter "necessary aid and support."

PRAVDA revealed Moscow's order of priorities, however, by concentrating on such issues as U.S.-Soviet relations, disarmament, European security, and a collective security system for Asia. Without specifically mentioning the upcoming summit, the editorial stated that the Soviet Union "attaches considerable importance to the development of equal mutually advantageous relations with the United States." Invoking "Leninist principles"

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of coexistence, it stressed that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is "possible and desirable but should not be achieved at the expense of third countries." Offering what amounts to a rationale for the summit, the editorial declared: "As to the Soviet-American contacts on disarmament, the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement in the talks on strategic arms limitation would suit the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and the interests of international security."

IZVESTIYA EDITORIAL The IZVESTIYA editorial made a similar case for Moscow's "consistent" foreign policy, stating that it "serves the vital interests of the peoples, facilitates the easing of international tensions, and supports the national liberation movements." Declaring that "the world is recognizing more and more that a settlement of international problems can and must be sought through negotiations rather than confrontation," the editorial recounted various Soviet contributions toward a lessening of world tensions. It noted that "tangible changes" were taking place in Europe as a result of Soviet initiatives, citing the Soviet and Polish treaties with the Federal Republic, the big-four agreement on Berlin, and preparations for a European security conference. Among "crucial documents" alleged to have improved international relations, it cited the U.N. general assembly proposal for a world disarmament conference, "taken at the initiative of the Soviet Union," and the convention on banning biological weapons.

OTHER COMMENT, REPORTAGE Soviet preparations for the summit were also reflected in belated TASS publicity, on the 16th, for a Gorokhov article in the May issue of the monthly INTERNATIONAL LIFE--signed to the press on 21 April--which argued for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The timing of the TASS release and the statement in the article that the USSR approaches the summit from "realistic positions" seemed designed as confirmation that the summit was on. The TASS release constituted the first Soviet commentary on U.S.-Soviet relations since IZVESTIYA political commentator Matveyev's article in the Soviet monthly USA, signed to the press on 13 April and given no publicity by TASS or Radio Moscow.

On 15 May PRAVDA intimated that the summit had not been aborted by Vietnam developments by publicizing TASS dispatches from London and New York reporting statements by U.S. officials to the effect that preparations for the trip were proceeding "according to plan." And a TASS dispatch from Washington on the 17th

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reported a White House press conference statement that the President was in Camp David preparing for "his coming trip to Moscow." Radio Moscow had reported on the 15th that in numerous letters and telegrams, Soviet citizens were expressing satisfaction that in the international arena a situation is developing that allows one to hope for new and important shifts toward easing international tension."

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+ TASS noted that the Soviet guests were accorded an "extremely warm welcome," underlining the friendly relations between the two countries "and the eagerness to develop and strengthen them." Damascus said the visitors received "a cordial welcome and warm hospitality" indicative of the Syrian people's sentiments of "friendship and kind feelings" toward the Soviet people.

+ Where TASS said that Grechko visited military units and "military educational establishments," Damascus reported that he visited military units and "frontline positions." Damascus added--but TASS did not--that Grechko at the end of the visit stressed his impression that the Syrian forces "have attained a high level of combat training and excellent mastery of their weapons." Damascus--but again not TASS--also reported Grechko as referring, in a reception speech on the 12th, to his visit to the frontlines where he was impressed by the Syrian armed forces' firmness and preparedness to "liberate" the occupied Arab territories.

+ The TASS report on the 14th concluded by noting the Syrians' expression of "sincere gratitude" for the USSR's "great unselfish aid" in strengthening Syria's defense and training national cadres. No such expression was recorded in Damascus' report. But Talas--at a reception given by Soviet Ambassador Mukhitdinov, reported by Damascus on the 12th--expressed gratitude for Soviet support to the Arabs and concluded that Grechko's visit would "undoubtedly contribute to the enhancement of the combat capability" of Syria's armed forces. Reporting Grechko's second visit with President al-Asad on the 13th, TASS said the Syrian president "highly assessed" the talks held between the two defense ministers and "the results achieved," which "are an important contribution" to strengthening friendship and cooperation between the Syrian and Soviet peoples.

MILITARY COOPERATION Still other discrepancies appeared in the two sides' reports of the military discussions. Damascus wrapped up the talks in a sentence to the effect that "fruitful discussions" were held on "strengthening military cooperation." TASS, on the other hand, while claiming that the talks were held in "an atmosphere of friendship and complete mutual understanding," indicated that there was less than full agreement in noting that the two sides "exchanged opinions" on questions of strengthening and further developing cooperation between the Soviet and Syrian armed forces. But TASS also said both

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aiden expressed satisfaction with the state of friendly relations between the two armies and noted a need "to further expand and strengthen" these relations in the interests of raising Syria's "defense potential" and consolidating the friendship between the Soviet and Syrian peoples. In this connection, TASS added, "an arrangement was made for taking a number of additional measures in the field of military cooperation." On the 13th TASS had reported that Grechko's talks with Maj. Gen. Talas "ended with the signing of a number of agreements on further developing Soviet-Syrian cooperation."

Neither side, of course, mentioned the possibility of a Soviet-Syrian treaty along the lines of those Moscow had concluded with Egypt and Iraq, or any linkage between such a treaty and military assistance. A possible hint of such a connection appeared in a 12 May SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by PRAVDA's former Middle East specialist Igor Belyayev. Discussing Soviet friendship and cooperation with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, Belyayev praised the Egyptian and Iraqi treaties and went on to say that the Egyptians and Iraqis, who are defending their countries against "Israeli aggression" and imperialist intrigues, "now have modern weapons at their disposal"; he conspicuously failed to include the Syrians.

Possibly with Syrian reluctance toward a treaty in mind, Moscow's 15 May followup commentary on the Grechko visit, broadcast in the Arabic service, assured listeners that in giving Syria and other Arab countries the "necessary assistance" the Soviet Union attaches no "conditions infringing on the Arabs' national sovereignty and independence." Explaining Soviet-Syrian military cooperation as stemming from the need to "reply firmly" to Israeli and imperialist designs, the commentary reiterated the charge that the Arabs' "enemies" were trying to disparage and misrepresent the "principled nature" of Soviet-Arab cooperation.

The Beirut daily AN-NAHAR speculated on the 12th that Syria's cautious, reserved attitude on the Grechko visit stemmed from its concern that "these 'important' talks drag it into discussions" on a friendship treaty, which it said Syria considers unnecessary. The paper claimed that this subject had been under serious discussion during the past few months but that the Syrian Ba'th Party had decided not to sign any treaty, believing that sincere cooperation with the USSR did not require an alliance agreement.

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GRECHKO REMARKS Damascus radio provided more details than TASS did in reporting the Grechko and Talae speeches at Ambassador Mukhitdinov's reception on the 12th. (Neither side indicated that speeches were exchanged at Talae's 11 May luncheon for Grechko or at his reception for the Soviet guests on the 13th.) Both versions cited Grechko's statement, along the lines of the recent Soviet-Egyptian communique, that in the circumstances the Arab states "have every reason to use other means, too," beyond political, to regain the occupied Arab lands. In the TASS version Grechko, prefacing this statement with an explanation of the "circumstances," described Israel as persisting in occupation of the Arab lands, thereby defying UN decisions, aggravating the situation, and--in a phrase pointedly omitted from Damascus' account--"frustrating attainment of a political settlement."

According to Damascus, Grechko reviewed Soviet-Syrian cooperation, noting that Syria was the first Arab country with which the USSR had concluded an economic and technical cooperation agreement and adding cryptically that "this cooperation has presently reached its climax."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRAVDA OBSERVER ARTICLE REBUTS CRITICISM FROM DUTCH CP

Moscow chose the authoritative format of a PRAVDA Observer (Obozrevatel) article on 12 May to respond to criticism of the CPSU by the small independent-minded Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) in February and March, blaming the Dutch party's leaders for a prolonged lack of contact between the CPSU and the CPN and accusing them of distorting the CPSU's position. The PRAVDA article also responded to complaints by the Dutch party, in the same February and March documents, about an article in this year's first issue of VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS (Problems of History of the CPSU) which had taken issue with former CPN leader De Groot on the historical role of the Comintern.

PRAVDA's choice of such an authoritative vehicle to air the CPSU's squabble with the relatively insignificant Dutch party attests to Moscow's continuing sensitivity to criticism from other parties, particularly on the score of CPSU interference in their affairs via efforts to achieve coordinated policy positions. Notably, summaries of the Observer article were broadcast by Radio Moscow to areas where, with only one exception, local communist parties either recently have had or still have major differences with the CPSU. Thus Moscow broadcast summaries in Spanish (twice), in German to Austria, and in Italian, Swedish, English to the United Kingdom, Greek, Japanese, and Indonesian. Summaries in German to Germany were the only ones that did not fall cleanly into the pattern.

The timing of PRAVDA's belated response to the CPN's charges seems related to the imminence of the 24th CPN Congress, scheduled for 26-28 May. The later of the two CPN documents to which the article replied had been published in the CPN organ in preparation for the congress. The timing may also be related, though less directly, to the opening in Moscow on 15 May of a two-day conference convened by the Institute of the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences to discuss "new phenomena in the world revolutionary working class movement" since the 1969 Moscow international communist conference. TASS reported on the 15th that the conference was attended by representatives from the USSR and all of its East European allies, including Romania, and that the opening speech by Katushev, CPSU Secretary in charge of relations with ruling parties, stressed the importance of close cooperation among

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the parties in the theoretical sphere. Hungarian Politburo member Komocsi read a report on the need for unity in the world communist movement, according to TASS, and the CPSU Central Committee's expert on West European affairs, Zagladin, took to task both rightwing "opportunists" and "leftist revisionists" in the international movement. The director of the sponsoring Soviet Institute, Timur Timofeyev, was elected chairman of a newly formed commission on "the working class in the world revolutionary process."

CPN DOCUMENTS PRAVDA's Observer responded to two CPN documents, the most recent one a CPN Executive Committee report published in the central party organ DE WAARHEID on 24 March in preparation for the 24th CPN Congress. The March report recalled and reiterated the substance of an earlier Executive Committee statement, dated 23 February and also published in DE WAARHEID, which rebutted VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS' criticism of the CPN's De Groot.*

The February CPN statement charged the authors of the Soviet journal article, A. P. Dimitriyev and K. K. Shirinya, with a "vicious" and "primitive" attempt to "sow dissension" in the CPN leadership. It complained that they tried to "whitewash" the German-Soviet pact of 1939, that they recalled the Comintern in "nostalgic" terms of approbation, and that they discussed the "Jewish question" in the Netherlands under the Nazi occupation with "disdain" and out of context. The CPN statement singled out the following passage from the Soviet journal article as particularly offensive:

De Groot's publication on the question of the history of the Comintern and his theoretical position play into the hands of the powers that are out to divide the communist movement and poison it with nationalism. Marxist-Leninists should not be indifferent to such phenomena but should take resolute action.

This, the CPN complained, was "a perfidious camouflaged provocation toward members of the CPN." The statement went on to assert that similar attempts had been made to "sow seeds of division" in other communist parties, "especially in the Spanish, Italian, and Japanese parties . . . despite the CPSU's agreement not to intervene. That this is now tried from Moscow in Holland by

* See the TRENDS of 15 March 1972, pages 17-21, for a discussion of this article among others in a spate of Soviet press commentaries stressing the need for better coordination among parties to achieve common ideological positions.

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means of a couple of writers indicates that this is a common revisionist phenomenon." The CPN statement added vituperatively:

Such actions show the falsity of all mealy-mouthed statements about noninterference in other parties, about equality, complete independence, and cooperation, about the possibility of existence of theoretical and practical differences of opinion, and so forth.

Regarding CPSU-CPN relations, both CPN documents said that in November 1969 the Dutch party leadership had proposed to the CPSU that a delegation be sent to the Netherlands to discuss "normalization of relations," but that in July 1970 the CPN had received "an oblique refusal" from Moscow. Stressing the Dutch party's "autonomy," the CPN leadership's March report said the party bases its relations with other CP's on the statement of the 1960 Moscow international communist meeting. The CPN did not attend such conclaves as the June 1969 Moscow international party conference, the report explained, because statements purporting to be "collective" were issued without the participation of key parties, particularly "from Asia." In these circumstances, the report said, "such get-togethers had to lead to a breach in the international communist movement."

The CPN's February statement and the March report both contained countervailing elements of caution, keeping the door open for a reconciliation with Moscow. The February statement sought to differentiate the attitude of the Soviet party as a whole from the "bad faith" of the "private individuals" who wrote the VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article, cautioning readers not to identify "this kind of person with the Soviet Union and the CPSU as such." And the March report observed that the CPN maintains its "internationalist" traditions "under the most difficult conditions and despite differences with people or leaders of the CPSU which, after all, are temporary."

PRAVDA'S REBUTTAL The 12 May PRAVDA Observer article directly challenged the CPN's allegation that the CPSU had rebuffed the Dutch party's 1969 overture for a meeting to discuss normalization of relations. Party relations had been interrupted in 1964 "at the initiative of the CPN leadership," PRAVDA countered, and "through no fault of the CPSU." Claiming that the CPSU had repeatedly over the years called for cooperation with the Dutch party, Observer said the Soviets in July 1970 had

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responded positively to CPN Chairman Hoekstra's suggestion that a bilateral meeting be held and had asked the CPN for "a more detailed statement of the range of questions it would like to discuss."

Noting a subsequent development the CPN documents had neglected to mention, PRAVDA claimed that in March 1971 Hoekstra advised the CPSU that the CPN was ready to receive a Soviet party delegation or to send a delegation of its own to Moscow and "would at a later date show initiative on this question." Observer insisted that the CPSU is still ready to resume bilateral contacts but that there has been no movement in this direction from the CPN since March 1971. Thus, Observer concluded, "the assertion that the CPSU is unwilling to have contacts with the CPN is completely untrue and can only mislead broad sections of the CPN membership."

Observer also responded to the Dutch party's complaints about the VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS article's treatment of De Groot's views, rejoining caustically that Soviet researchers and scholars have as much right as anyone else to express views on the history of the communist movement. The article charged the CPN leadership with impugning the CPSU's right to discuss a subject the Dutch party itself had discussed publicly, in effect rejecting the Dutch party's complaint that the Soviet journal article constituted CPSU interference in CPN affairs.

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HUNGARY - U S S R

MOSCOW AND BUDAPEST PAPER OVER ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES

Moscow and Budapest continue to make efforts to efface the embarrassment caused by Hungarian Premier Fock's frank revelations, on his return home from Moscow in late March, about unresolved economic differences in his talks with Kosygin and Brezhnev.* TASS on 6 May reported a Budapest speech by Fock denouncing "Western" conjectures about the March talks and affirming the "harmonious" economic relationship between the two countries. While reporting Fock's description of the March talks as "extremely useful and successful," the brief TASS summary failed to report statements about unresolved bilateral economic problems contained in the text of his speech broadcast by Budapest radio on the 5th-- notably, Fock's expression of hope that agreements encompassing long-term Soviet guarantees of raw-material shipments to Hungary would be concluded by the end of this year.

A further disclaimer of bilateral friction was made in a 13 May PRAVDA article by Fock, entitled "Hungary and the CEMA Comprehensive Program," which was reprinted the next day in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG. The Budapest radio's press review on the 14th gratuitously reported that Fock had dwelt on the "lessons" of the economic negotiations with the Soviets, a term not used in his article. While acknowledging "differences" regarding Hungary's role in CEMA integration, Fock took a harder line than in his Budapest speech a week earlier in scoring "our enemies'" efforts to "drive a wedge" and "detach the socialist countries from the Soviet Union" by circulating "false, hostile rumors and conjectures" about the March talks. He described the Hungarian-Soviet "political and economic alliance" as "close and indestructible."

However, Fock conceded that the "practical" and "specific" definition of Hungary's role in CEMA integration had not yet been determined: "The differing economic standards of the CEMA countries which, despite unity on the main questions, have differences of approach to a number of specific questions . . . give rise to the necessity for discussion, thorough study, and coordinated views." He went on to spell out the dual emphasis in Budapest's view of foreign trade--stressing both its heavy

* For background, see TRENDS of 19 April, pages 42-44.

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volume of trade with the CEMA countries, especially the USSR, and the long-range prospect that the CEMA states would "probably find points of contact with West European countries which will make it possible to expand trade relations."

On the same day that Fock's article appeared in PRAVDA, MTI reported an interview in NEPSZABADSAG with Soviet Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Leonid Zorin in which Zorin stressed the "dynamic development" of the Hungarian-Soviet economic relations. Underscoring Hungary's dependence on Soviet raw materials, he noted that it gets "almost all" its iron ore and three-fourths of its petroleum from the USSR. Judging by the MTI report, Zorin did not allude to the speculation about differences between the two countries.

Close economic relations between Budapest and Moscow were also underscored in articles in the 30 April NEPSZABADSAG by Hungarian Politburo member Nyers and Foreign Trade Minister Biro, which recalled Fock's March talks in Moscow in wholly positive terms, with no indication of differences. Regarding Soviet raw materials deliveries, Biro went out of his way to insist that "the Soviet partners have unfailingly adhered to prearranged delivery dates and schedules and, if they deviate from them at all, they do so on the side of expediting rather than postponing them." Biro had just returned from 28-29 April talks in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. The communique on those talks, carried by TASS and MTI on the 29th, indicated that the negotiations on future expansion of bilateral trade had been inconclusive since further talks on the subject were scheduled to be held in Moscow in May and in Budapest in July. Only the MTI version added that "apart from the above-mentioned topic, the ministers reviewed bilateral and multilateral relations concerning both parties" and that the atmosphere of the talks had been one of "cordiality, mutual understanding, and friendship."

YAKUBOVSKIY TASS on the 16th tersely reported the arrival in
IN BUDAPEST Budapest of the Warsaw Pact commander, Marshal
Yakubovskiy. The MTI report on the 15th--the date
of his arrival--added that he was on an "official visit that will last for a few days" and listed the welcoming delegation headed by Defense Minister Czinege. The next day MTI reported "a cordial and friendly exchange of ideas" between Yakubovskiy and Czinege on "topical questions of mutual interest to the parties regarding the Warsaw Pact member states' joint defense organization." Yakubovskiy had stressed the member countries' "patriotic and internationalist duty" in his article in the 14 May PRAVDA on the Pact's 17th anniversary.

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CHINA

CAMPAIGN REPUDIATING LIN PIAO CONTINUES TO EXPAND

The purge of Lin Piao has presented the PRC leadership with the problem of how to repudiate the man who is still constitutionally designated Mao's successor as party chairman and who was lauded for five years as Mao's "best pupil." So far the media have conducted the campaign in a manner reminiscent of the cultural revolution purge of Mao's previous successor in waiting, Liu Shao-chi. Liu was vilified as "China's Khrushchev" and other such characterizations for two years before he was publicly criticized by name following the decision of the 12th plenum in November 1968 to strip him of all offices. Similarly Lin has been attacked indirectly as a "swindler like Liu Shao-chi" while, as with Liu, a case is being built up against him for deviations in almost every field.

Among the more open attacks on Lin has been an article broadcast by the Peking domestic radio on 10 May which even more obviously than usual identified the villain of the recently revised opera "On the Docks" in terms pointing to Lin. The article noted that the villain had "a sharp counterrevolutionary sense of smell" and that upon sensing from the communique of the 10th plenum of the 8th central committee that another political movement was in the offing, he decided to "have another trial of strength with the proletariat." The episode clearly brings to mind Lin's reported discomfiture after the 2d plenum of the 9th central committee, his alleged attempt at a coup, and his final reported attempt at escape--like the villain who, if he failed, "planned to escape to a foreign country."

Other articles have kept up a steady barrage of criticism aimed at the "swindler" Lin. A RED FLAG article broadcast on 14 May attacked him for the methods of study he advocated which separated theory and practice, making people "trouble themselves with daily trifles and forget the general line." This may be a reference to such widespread cultural revolution practices as rote memorization of Mao's sayings. Similarly a Kwangsi broadcast on 12 May criticized Lin for teaching the "obsolescence of Marxism-Leninism," another reference to the cultural revolution period when all theory worth studying was said to be contained in Mao's works.

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One major line of attack on Lin has been to blame him for overdoing attacks on cadres in such a way as to cause divisiveness rather than to promote unity. For example, a HEILUNGKIANG DAILY editorial on 9 May criticized the "wornout tactics" of harming other people and dividing the revolutionary ranks, and called on people to help erring comrades while reserving "bitter hatred for swindlers like Liu." A Szechwan broadcast on 5 May went even further against extreme measures adopted during the cultural revolution, attacking the method of "savage struggle, merciless blows, and 'killing everyone with one blow of the stick.'" This was said to be the method of swindlers and "diametrically opposite to Chairman Mao's cadre policy." The Szechwan commentary absolved Mao from blame by stating that though the swindlers "decked themselves out as representatives of the correct line," only Mao can be such a representative, and so in the end the swindlers "embarked on the criminal road of betraying the party."

Lin has also begun to be attacked for his economic policies. Though some articles last summer and fall seemed to be aimed at his views on economic priorities, the anti-Lin campaign had not advanced far enough to make the identity of the target completely certain. Recent criticisms of alleged agricultural errors are unmistakably aimed at Lin, however. A Szechwan commentary on 3 May attacking those who slandered the peasants and tried to sunder the worker-peasant alliance referred to Mao's "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" as having criticized this attitude; the work was originally entitled "Letter to Comrade Lin Piao." Those who had earlier tried to subvert the worker-peasant alliance continued to oppose Mao's rural policies, according to the Szechwan commentary, which thus managed to implicate Lin with all of the errors of the past, from the extreme right of "dragging the peasants back to the capitalist road" to the extreme left of "abolishing private plots."

The campaign against Lin, including documents reportedly circulating in China but not surfacing in the PRC media, apparently is being firmly directed from the center, in contrast to the vilification of Liu Shao-chi by freewheeling Red Guards subject to few controls. The release of the Lin documents, as well as the conduct of the campaign in the media, may have been a matter of controversy among the leadership. An article in RED FLAG No. 3 on the role of teachers by negative example seemed to defend the use of revealing details of evildoers' crimes

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against complaints by "some comrades" who feared making public the counterrevolutionary and anti-Mao deeds. They were said to feel that the poisonous weeds "are, after all, poisonous, and that taking them to the masses is liable to create a negative influence." The article rejected this view as underestimating the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, but it did admit that "making public" the negative materials would allow an opportunity for class enemies "to make trouble." However, it claimed that this would only allow them to be exposed more easily. The article was adamant that the best way of exposing the "true features" of the counterrevolutionaries who have unmasked themselves is to "let the cadres and the broad masses get in touch with the materials of instruction by negative example."

"LEFTIST" EDUCATIONAL LINE OF "SWINDLERS" DENOUNCED

Unusually pointed commentaries on the status of educational reorganization reveal continuing relaxation of educational reforms undertaken during the cultural revolution as well as a developing campaign to build a case against Lin Piao and his followers for pushing a "leftist" educational line. Radio Peking on 13 May, for example, broadcast an article written by the party committee of a local technological college which reported on the struggle there to overcome the influence of "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi" who "undermined and interfered with Chairman Mao's proletarian educational line." Admonishing those teachers who were temporarily taken in by this incorrect line and "dared not read professional books because they were afraid of being denounced as devoting themselves to their professions," and "dared not lecture on basic theory because they were afraid of making the mistake of underrating practice," Radio Peking firmly argued that "if we fail to link political work with professional work we shall abandon our political leadership over professional work."

Current calls to provide suitable employment for experienced rehabilitated veteran cadres--a recently intensified theme in the ongoing ideological struggle against Lin--were reflected in the article's claim that teacher morale problems existed at the college because "aged and middle-aged teachers were not boldly used" and "young teachers . . . were assigned to take charge of major tasks in teaching and scientific research while others were given leading positions at various levels." The college's

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party committee corrected this problem by conducting "a comprehensive analysis of the employment of teachers in the college" and then making "rational readjustments." As a result of this rearrangement, "a number of aged and middle-aged teachers were selected to take leading positions at various levels." In dealing with young teachers, it was specifically declared, "we have resolutely overcome the tendency toward only using them but not training them" and "have encouraged old teachers to help young ones in theoretical study." Young teachers were even "permitted to attend classes without participation in production" in order to help them overcome their shortcomings in "basic theory."

By implicitly linking Lin to past "leftist" deviations in educational reform, the more moderate voices in Peking today are able to further blacken his image while at the same time using the far-reaching repudiation campaign to help overcome any lingering resistance to a flexible interpretation of the cultural revolution's educational reforms and to the moderate restructuring of a new educational system. For example, the call to ease worker-peasant entry into the formal educational apparatus--an extremely sensitive issue at the beginning of the cultural revolution--now seems to have lost its urgency amid current efforts to raise educational standards. This was illustrated in an unusually frank Sian radio commentary on 9 April which lauded local workers and peasants for adopting the attitude that "if our application [for university enrollment] is approved, we will study for the revolution; if not, we will work happily where we are and actively make contributions to the party and people." Pointing out that "it is impossible to satisfy the desires of all workers, peasants, and soldiers who want to go to a university," the commentary explained that "it is quite normal for the applications of some comrades to be disapproved." Prospective worker-peasant students were told to "have one red heart and two sets of preparations and be happy whether they go or stay."

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